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Abstract. The Arab Spring has forced observers to associate the southern
shore of the Mediterranean with social and political dynamism, even though a
great deal of uncertainty surrounds the whole area. The present contribution is
dedicated to processes of civic and political participation occurring in Tunisia.
These processes of political subjectivation present an evident reference to the
speculative imagination of the future. By considering the biographies of social
actors, I will focus on itineraries of personal commitment, which take shape
within the framework of the heterogeneous Tunisian civil society.
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1. Introduction. The crisis and the future
The Arab Spring has forced observers and researchers to associate the
southern shores of the Mediterranean with social dynamism and the
emergence of original ideas of the future [El Houssi 2013; Haugbølle,
Cavatorta 2012], even though a great deal of uncertainty hovers over the
whole area. Ten years later, the uprisings that inflamed North Africa and
the Middle East, also triggering social movements and political mobilisation
around the world [Werbner, Webb, Spellman-Poots 2014], seem not to
have brought the desired results. These uprisings have, rather, rarefied
into oppressive forms of life marked by persistent political repression and
economic slumps, crushed in a present apparently devoid of a prospective
outlook on the future.
This contribution is based on ethnographic research in post-revolutionary
Tunisia. The research took place during my PhD course and involved
82 Giovanni Cordova
fieldwork in the Grand Tunis area between 2016 and 2018. The ethnography
focused particularly on the suburban belt of Tunis, where the interlocutors I
met live, and with whom I have established solid ethnographic relationships.
The research aimed to investigate, by combining observant participation
[Piasere 2002; Moeran 2007] and more formalised moments such as semi-
structured interviews, the ordinary worlds of young Tunisians of the middle
and popular classes, stratified forms of life in whose riverbed complex cultural
meanings and political imagination take shape.
A relevant part of the ethnographic work was also dedicated to recent parties
and association experiences that mark the entry into the Tunisian organised
public sphere [Habermas 1988] of groups and individuals whose political
subjectivation – their passage au politique [Bayart 2008] – took place or
significantly changed in the context of the revolutionary process. This is
the main theme of the article, which will stress how social actors’s political
subjectivation is intimately linked to «futural orientations» [Bryant, Knight
2019, 16] that are moving themselves and communities toward an imagined
future not yet realised.
Centrality – albeit in limited spaces – will be attributed to the biographies of
social actors in an attempt to glimpse the complexity of their subjectivities
against the background of recent great political transformation. With the
expression “political subjectivation”, I define a process in which an ethical
reorientation of the Self of social actors matures, inspired by shared ideas and
views of the future. It is also the harbinger of a rephrasing of social relations
and the assumption of agency and political responsibility [Vacchiano, Afailal
2019].
The following pages deal with images of the future that the social actors
– especially youth, but not exclusively – have formulated, originating from
a permanent condition of crisis and high uncertainty. In Tunisia, current
processes of civic and political participation present an evident reference to
the temporal dimension of the future. Although different from each other, the
practices and representations underlying the experiences that I will recount in
the following pages can be considered as «forms of social anticipation [that]
often press toward the future in ways that imply crossing into another space
of time and a radical reorientation of the present» [Bryant, Knight 2019, 36].
The notion of civil society, on the other hand, deserves a careful
problematisation beyond its celebratory usages. In fact, civil society’s most
common usages «have been too narrowly circumscribed by modern western
models of liberal-individualism» [Hann 1996, 3]. Following the classic
division between civil and political society would make it difficult to identify
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intersections between networks of trust and solidarity and political-oriented
participation1.
The case of the Islamic public sphere is emblematic since it fuels the display
of morally sanctioned virtues and the assumption of collective responsibility
in the articulation of the relationship between individual salvation and social
order, transversally crossing civil and political society [Salvatore 2011]2.
Islamic solidarity and charitable associations offer a wide network of services
(from education to health) that feeds social capital, which can be mobilised
by religiously-inspired parties.
Tunisian associative and political groups, which I had the opportunity to
follow in the first person during my field research, are attempting to redefine
social community bonds. They have chosen this route despite the difficulties
that the post-revolutionary course is encountering, starting from a speculative
imagining of the future, and attempting to determine it by actively intervening
in the present. This intervention, as I have previously noted, matures in a
context that is anything but rosy. Ten years after 2011, Tunisia is an economic,
social and political “black hole” (comprised of inflation, unemployment,
indebtedness, etc.), which no one knows how to get out of [Brésillon 2018].
The disintegration of the middle class, the yardstick of the possibilities of
social ascension, finds its most painful expression in the unemployment faced
by young holders of higher education qualifications. The social elevator is
stuck, and the gap between economic elites and groups now reduced to
subsistence is widening.
It should be specified that this condition is certainly not new – and not
limited only to Tunisia – and could be traced back to well before the 2011
Revolution, across the whole Arab world. Much earlier, in the seventies,
Tunisian President Bourguiba began the neoliberal economic season of
“openness” (infitah) to free-market logic after a decade of leaning towards
socialist state planning in the economy [Manduchi 2019]. And it was
during the nineties – in parallel with the dismantling of the Welfare State
[Gherib 2017] – that graduate unemployment increased, testifying to the
disconnection between the educational system and the labour market, in
Tunisia as in the entire Maghreb region [Bennani-Chraïbi 2007].
As well as increasing economic and social inequalities [Pontiggia 2017],
the consequences of neoliberal policies undertaken in the last decades have
1 Annika Rabo [1996] urges us to look at the interdependencies between State and society
[Sharma, Gupta 2006]. For a critical perspective on civil society in the Middle East and North
Africa, cf. Härdig [2015], not to mention the more general rethinking of secularism in civil society
made by Jürgen Habermas [2010].
2 See also Copertino [2017], who examines how in contemporary Tunisia the Islamic political
and religious activisms are related to original and innovative interpretations of Islamic political-
philosophical thought.
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had a profound impact, especially on youths’ everyday lives. These youths
can only partially access any expectation of social autonomy and political
significance; their images recur in mass media consumption and dreams of
reaching adulthood.
This is a condition of “waithood” [Singerman 2007; Honwana 2012], a time
of suspension in which the transition to adulthood is not carried out according
to the usual modes and expected times. It is not only based on economic
deprivation but on the inability to or impossibility of taking part in goods
and services exchange networks and mutual aid relations3. In the various
testimonies of social actors I spoke to during the fieldwork, they referred
to the agonising fear of social anomy. This was centred around a feeling of
“being no-one” after all the years of training (professional or university), a
herald not only of a chronic absence of work but also the impossibility of
accessing a defined status as a person, with its load of prescribed obligations
and recognised social meanings4.
This state of crisis gives shape to a collective sense of living, an affective
time [Schatzki 2010; Bryant, Knight 2019] that shapes the understanding of
the present and which can become the generating principle of dispositions,
practices, and representations [Bourdieu 2003]. A time of uncertainty, whose
liminal transience, certified by the expression “democratic transition” with
which the post-revolution years are classified, extends without promoting
the expected social improvement, generating disorientation in its place.
Furthermore, this state of crisis seems to undermine the construction of social
ties oriented to the assumption of collective responsibility, civic commitment,
and reciprocity [Kerrou 2018].
However, an ethnographic gaze on minute but significant processes of
political subjectivation in progress cannot fail to grasp the sedimentation of
networks of trust and solidarity emerging from practices and representations
of individuals and communities, mostly defined on a local basis.
In the following pages, I will select two very different examples of civic and
political engagement in contemporary Tunisia that seem to me to recall very
clearly the processes of future-oriented political subjectivation underway.
Despite their diversity, the experiences and testimonies I will give an account
of draw on the evocation of a future whose potential is outlined and channelled
into collective projects aimed at realising the «other than-actual» [Bryant,
Knight 2019, 107).
3 Delay in contracting marriage (a social mark of adulthood, like employment and economic
subsistence) is a clear example. Among young men aged between 25 and 30 years old, more than
the 82% are unmarried, (the percentage drops to 50% for young women).
4 Navtej Dhillon and Djavad Salehi-Isfahani [2008] identified “stalled youth transitions” to
adulthood in North Africa and the Middle East well before the Arab Spring.
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I believe that this falls within the temporality that the 2011 Revolution
triggered, net of its failures and its difficulties. The liberating and
emancipatory act of the Arab Spring has encouraged multitudes of men and
women to glimpse and pursue those possibilities that are not yet fulfilled in
all respects but which already exist alongside the actual5.
2. Citizens’ associations
New Tunisian citizens’ associations fight the desertification of social spaces
and the desocialisation of city dwellers. They offer a wide range of services
(literacy and after-school education; theatre courses and film screenings;
assistance to the poor, etc.) and experiment with creative uses of public
space (like cleaning and regeneration of gardens and play areas). They
also organise assemblies on topics of collective relevance and provide a
space to think critically about problems that afflict young people. They,
therefore, recreate institutional proximity in the forms of representation and
decision making on which urban democracy is based [Sebastiani 2014]. This
dimension of solidarity, represented by associations, must be related to the
privatisation of the State [Hibou 2000] and its progressive economic and
social disengagement in the context of the changes in neoliberal governance
that are also affecting Tunisian political institutions [Ben Amor 2011].
An example of these post-revolutionary political subjectivities that I would
like to focus on is the Association des Habitants d’El Mourouj II (El Mourouj
II Inhabitants’ Association). El Mourouj is a municipality bordering Tunis. It
rises close to the southern basin of the Sabkha salt lake. Along the edges of
the lake, the migration from the hinterland after the Second World War has
given rise to informal settlements, which have characterised the history of the
peri-urban substratum of Tunis.
The president of the association is Adel Azabi, who worked in a tobacco
manufacturing plant in Tunis before retiring, and who I met thanks to a mutual
acquaintance in the UGTT (Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail/Tunisian
General Labour Union) trade union, wherein Adel militated until a few years
ago. The headquarters of the association is beside Adel’s home and hosts the
meetings of the local section of the UGTT trade union centre. The association
was not founded with the Arab Spring since it has been active already from
the 1980s. However, since the liberalisation of public space following the
Revolution, it has changed its practices and methods of action. Before, the
association was almost exclusively engaged in the search for international
5 Potentiality for Bryant and Knight is a «shared way of understanding the future» whose stakes
are largely political, given that «potentiality […] is a discursive device that can be used to
formulate, activate or resist particular imagined futures [2019, 121-126]».
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partnerships to receive funding for regional redevelopment projects. Today,
activities are much more rooted in the local context.
You can come to understand this by walking in the central districts of the
municipality, whose walls are strewn with posters, banners and stickers
with the association’s logo and a reminder of the activities they carry out.
The solidarity economy is the association’s preferential sphere of action.
On Saturdays and Sundays, a supportive suq was set up. Notable features
included the reliability of the producers and the traceability of the products.
Collaboration was established with a chicken farm in Tunis, where a set of
electronic scales and a large freezer were purchased in which to store the meat.
The goal of this investment, in Adel’s words, was to establish a relationship
with the local people, who can now know in detail exactly what they are
buying. Despite the rather secular nature of the association, an iftar dinner is
prepared on Fridays during the month of Ramadan, in which food is offered
to the poor of the municipality.
Adel is known and loved by many people in the municipality. When we
walk together, there is no one who passes by who does not greet him and
does not stop to point out some issue. Adel called my attention to several
small neglected green spaces. He informed me that the association had sent a
request to the municipality to be entitled to manage these green spaces with
the intention of returning them to collective use.
Old Adel’s leadership is combined with the fundamental work of young
volunteers, mostly women. A look at how associative action is embodied in
the work and stories of these young female participants in the contemporary
Tunisian public scene will offer us an interesting perspective on the processes
of constitution of political subjectivities in post-revolutionary Tunisia.
A trait I have also found in other Tunisian associations [Cordova 2020] is
the ability of the organisation to comprehensively understand cultural codes
and different interpretative registers, by which their heterogeneous figure
is enhanced. This is reflected in the internal variety of volunteer profiles.
The association’s coordinator is Shaima, a 25-year-old woman who recently
returned to Tunisia from France, where she studied psychology. Shaima has
chosen to return because she wants to collaborate on the new Tunisian course,
motivated by her own experiences of the difficulties and the setbacks faced
by the post-revolutionary season. The images of the riots that periodically
inflame Tunisia in various regions, certifying the still-unfinished character of
the revolutionary enterprise, prompted her to plan her return to a place where,
as she told me, cousins apart, many still don’t recognise her and do not greet
her on the street. Aware of the delicacy of the stakes in a country struggling
with a fragile democratic transition, Shaima felt “obliged” to participate in
a process in which everyone must do their part, because «it represents the
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possibility of affecting the future of our lives, of our country»6. Once in Tunis,
she went to live with her mother’s cousins in the municipality of Mourouj.
There, she immediately noticed the presence of the association through
posters hanging on the neighbourhood walls and contacted the organisation’s
Facebook page just four days after arriving in Tunisia.
Returning was not easy since she had to overcome the resistance of her
father, a worker in Marseille, and her mother, for whom returning to Tunis
represented a senseless and extremely risky choice. However, the pain caused
by the separation from her parents was compensated for by her conviction that
she was making an important decision: to work towards what Tunisia is not
yet, but still has the potential to become. She repeated that she saw the seething
telluric potential in turmoil and at risk of not being realised in the hoped-for
future if things do not go the right way. In my opinion, Shaima’s example
testifies how the political and ethical reorientation of the Self can heavily
affect the circularity of movements between the shores of the Mediterranean
and determine the reversibility of transnational mobility routes. Later, Shaima
would like to create an organisation dedicated to autistic children, «if I can
find a place in this still undefined Tunisia». Personal future and collective
future are linked in a subjective plot in which the fear of not being able to find
one’s place in the world and the anxiety of non-belonging [Middleton 2013]
do not affect the associative commitment imbued with images of the future.
Another young woman, Monia, a veiled twenty-three-year-old computer
science student based in Tunis and a member of the Association des Habitants
d’El Mourouj II, is also part of an association very close to the circles of
the Islamic charity, with which she organises events and assistance paths for
those most in need. Monia explicitly outlined the popular character of the
association of the inhabitants of El Mourouj II, to be understood here in the
meaning of socio-cultural transversality.
According to her, the strength of the association lies precisely in the ability to
speak to the whole population without disdaining those who have a religious
sensitivity. Urban regeneration and promotion of moments of collective
reacquisition from below of social spaces are coupled with the organisation
of iftar dinners and moments of conviviality on the occasion of traditional
religious festivals. The involvement of the strata of the population seemingly
furthest from the ideals of emancipation and “secular” participation in the
public sphere is recognised as a condition for building relationships of
reliability and mutual recognition, necessary for undertaking paths of social
transformation. The volunteers of the inhabitants’ association are motivated
6 From an interview with the author, El Mourouj II, 18-10-2017. The conversations quoted in
this article were held partly in Tunisian Arabic and partly in French, according to my limits in
mastering the first.
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by the belief that the ability to transform their own and others’ living
conditions is not innate. Rather, it is a skill that must be gradually constructed.
To reinforce this perspective, the testimony given to me by Monia focused
on some women active in the popular devotional cults of a nearby zâwiya 7.
These women met at an iftar dinner set up by the association during Ramadan,
who then came to the appointment for the cleaning and reorganisation of a
garden in a state of neglect. Despite the initial mutual distrust, an occasion
for festive sharing has turned into the signing of a common commitment,
maturing into a personal contribution to the improvement of a collective social
space. The capacity to aspire is, like protest, a social and collective capacity
[Appadurai 2013], which draws its strength from local systems of value,
meaning, communication and dissent. Its form is universally recognisable, but
its strength is distinctly local and cannot be separated from language, social
values, histories and institutional norms, which tend to be highly specific.
Monia herself said that she approached the association of the inhabitants of
El Mourouj with great caution, given that her conservative family was not
favourable to acquaintance with Adel, known in the municipality for having
been a union activist of the Tunisian left. Monia had never been a part of
a formal organisation before but wanted to try a new experience to put into
practice her ideas and desires for change. Although fearing that this simple
approach to that reality would expose her to criticism and slander, her first
contacts with the other members of the association, however, showed her the
absence of prejudices in them.
«This country needs us. The results will be seen over time»8, Monia said. It
is no coincidence that these desires for change mature and take shape in a
historical and political context marked by a great upheaval – the Revolution
and the end of the Ben Ali regime – whose continuation is in the making.
The correlation between individual and collective (or communitarian)
futural orientations, even if inspired by global spheres of values and
imaginaries, is rooted in local, familiar and cultural contexts, reflecting
the link between existential trajectories – imbued with feelings, modes of
perception, affectivity, fear, desire – and social formations that shape and
organise those ways of feeling [Ortner 2005]. The passage to the assumption
of personal responsibility in one’s own moral and political community
is accomplished through the incorporation of broader social processes,
witnessing how subjective existence is inscribed – without being totally
determined – in concrete historical possibilities and temporal structures that
shape the collective sense of living.
7 The zâwiya, in the Maghreb, is a polysemic term that indicates a place of worship, the seat
of a brotherhood, a school. It is a complex of social and religious life from which religious and
profane uses and practices of sociality unfold.
8 From an interview with the author, El Mourouj II, 19-10-2018.
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In my ethnographic work, I also found inclinations, practices, and
representations similar to those cited in the example of the El Mourouj II
association in other urban progressive associations. Their local roots were
evident (a neighbourhood, a municipality, a district). Both young and old
activists were able to carry out projects and activities within multiple symbolic
registers with the intention of not excluding anyone.
The combination of meanings, styles of collective action and of the same
organisational methods of associations explicitly rooted in local contexts is
not entirely new in Tunisia and the Maghreb. Equally, there is certainly no
lack of analysis, which highlight the potential and the limits of this approach
and, above all, the depoliticisation of social issues caused by the mobilisation
of common local belongings [Bennani-Chraïbi 2007]. However, the now
systemic extension of this configuration has become more evident than in
the past, I believe, also thanks to the hegemonic celebration of civil society’s
virtues [Ghatak, Abel 2013] after the fall of the Ben Ali regime. According
to many activists involved in associations that arose in the aftermath of the
Spring of 2010–2011, the new civil society organisations tend to reproduce
much less frequently the social, cultural and ideological fractures in militant
action in the construction of consensus than the organisations of the Tunisian
left. The reason for this posture is not (only) instrumental, aimed at creating
consensus through the identification of metaphorical and public behaviour
levers best suited to the cultural worlds of men and women [Appadurai 2013].
I believe it depends, above all, on the fluid existential trajectories of young
activists who choose to commit to social change, experiencing first-hand the
heterogeneity of cultural environments, the complementarity of practices and
social interactions, and the variety of aspirations and expectations oriented
towards the future.
3. Other activisms
Groups and organisations that are accessing the public sphere of Maghreb
societies elaborate in original grammars and forms the notions of citizenship
and general interest (al-‘âma) in States where, like in Tunisia, political
authoritarianism has undermined forms of civic and collective participation,
narrowing any space for mediation with the State to the development
of clientelar networks [Chabbi 2016]. Citizenship (muwâtana) matures,
changing its classic constitutive paradigm, which has historically been
intimately linked to the religious and nationalist matrices of Ummah and
watan [Longuenesse 2017]. It asserts rather a negotiation of the meanings,
burdens and rights of what it means to be members of a political community
[Holston 1999].
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However, we would be wrong to elect this specific associative configuration,
inspired by a quite progressive imaginary – although ready to hybridise in
the multiple registers and cultural meanings that compose the subjectivities
of their young and older members – as a homogenous figure of a civil society
hypostatised in its membership of Western liberal models and canons. If civil
society is an aggregate of social capital that promotes a culture of the public
with potentially political outcomes, it would not be correct to exclude a priori
from the legitimate civil society subjects and groups which rest their raison
d’être on a moral and normative ground other than secularist rationalism
[Persichetti 2006; Roque 2017]9.
This is even more important in Tunisia, commonly recognised as a peculiar
Arab country, where relations between the “secular” and the “sacred” take
unique and exemplary forms across the whole region. Behind these taken-
for-granted assumptions, however, there are historical and political remarks
that must be recalled, even if very briefly. In the process of formation of the
post-colonial independent State, President Bourguiba paid great attention to
removing every possible obstacle to the settling of the new modernist national
narrative, starting with alternative community memberships (tribal, religious,
etc.). Part of this strategy was the severe repression of Islamist activists and,
most of all, the monopolisation of Islam and the dismantling of its main
institutions – the Zaytouna university; the Quranic schools; habous properties
and so on [Mabrouk 2011]. This operation did not lead to the disappearance
of Islam in public life. On the contrary, Bourguiba actively intervened in
the religious domain, proposing instrumental lectures and interpretations
concerning the Quran and the Prophet’s life. However, beyond political
manipulation (to which we should include Ben Ali’s control over religion), we
should never overlook the complex stratification of Islam in Tunisia, strongly
rooted in popular as well as in high traditions – just think of the great Islamic
centres of Kairouan and Tunis; the large networks of confraternal Sufism; the
importance of reform-minded scholars like Mohammed Tahar Ben Achour;
the connections of militants with Pan-Arabism and global Islam’s tendencies
[Kerrou 2018].
In order to take into account this historical complexity, I would like to
propose an itinerary of political subjectivation apparently irreducible to the
experiences of associations such as that of El Mourouj II, and which concerns
Mousab, a young militant of the Islamic-conservative Ennahdha party10.
9However, at a closer look, the ideal type of a rationalised secular public sphere could not be
assumed apodictically even outside Muslim-majority countries. Cf. Muehlebach 2012; Ghatak,
Abel 2013.
10 Ennahdha is a religious conservative political party that has recently officially left political
Islam, in which context it was founded in 1981. Winner of the 2011 National Constituent
Assembly elections, it holds the largest representation in the current parliament, after the 2019
elections, with 52 seats. Cf. Ayari, Brésillon 2018; McCarthy 2018.
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Talking about a political party in a contribution that examines the concept of
civil society may seem out of place. However, parties such as Ennahdha base
the coagulation of political consensus and hegemony on a network of social
ties and connections based on trust – often consolidated in associations on a
territorial basis – which, in addition to the provision of various services, also
articulate political recognition and religious identification [Merone, Sigillò,
De Facci 2018; Sigillò 2020]11. It is a civil society that crosses the political
action of one of the most structured parties on the contemporary Tunisian
scene, despite the recent evolution of Ennahdha. In order to dispel the shadow
of suspicious ties with the Salafist galaxy, in 2016, the party established
a formal separation between political and religious-charitable activities12,
formally detaching itself from the Muslim Brotherhood and renouncing
political Islam [Ounissi 2016]. The concise reference to Mousab’s history
requires us to broaden the conceptual and analytical grids with which we
usually think of political commitment, evaluating the hybridisation between
cultural matrices that are different, yet equally aimed at achieving personal
and community emancipation, demonstrating how the trajectories of political
activism seldom show predictable linearity [Bennani-Chraïbi 2007].
Mousab is a 24-year-old militant from Ennhadha and was a candidate in the
2019 legislative elections13. He was introduced to me thanks to a personal
contact close to the party. His mother is Egyptian, while his father, who died a
few years ago, was Tunisian. The latter was an Islamist and, as an opponent of
Ben Ali (he also wrote in some clandestine newspapers against the regime),
he fled the country to escape imprisonment and oppression by the regime.
Mousab has vivid memories of those years on the run, in different parts of
Africa, following his father: Madagascar, Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia. He
recalls how in these last two places, there was no freedom, especially in Saudi
Arabia, where «it can be said that politics does not exist». For this reason,
he attended Arabic-speaking schools in various parts of the world, but not in
Tunisia. His father was active in Islamic charitable organisations in all those
countries. Mousab recalled his father’s proselytism work in Africa, which
would also lead to the conversion of ministers of Madagascar and influential
figures of the ruling class.
Mousab returned to Tunisia in 2010, but without his father, who remained in
Germany with his brother. Suffering from an incurable disease, he died a few
weeks before Ben Ali’s escape. Back in Tunis, Mousab went to live with his
11 See also the recent work by Domenico Copertino [2020] about the entanglements between
Islamists’ and Islamic Piety’s activists.
12 However, relations between Islamic associations and political parties – like Ennahdha – are
not linear, since they may be fraught with tensions and fragmentation [Soli, Merone 2013; Sigillò
2020].
13 The material shown here, including Mousab’s quotes, refers to our meeting on 23/11/2018 in
Tunis.
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paternal grandparents in Zaarouni, a popular neighbourhood between Bardo
and Manouba. The memory of his father’s illness and the latter’s inability
to set foot in Tunisia marked his adolescence, representing a founding event
in his personal history. He told me how, at the end of 2010, he reached by
bicycle Avenue Bourguiba, the scene of the great demonstrations against the
regime, without knowing what to expect and what to do. His only intention
was to go and have a look, because he knew that in those days, the history of
Tunisia would be written. He, too, shared the sensation, widespread among the
Tunisian population, that the uncertain ongoing revolutionary moment was
inscribing a temporal threshold within the present, which «implies both the
imminence of the future and the idea of pressing forward into it» [Bryant,
Knight 2019, 35].
He began to militate in Ennahdha in 2012, when Tunisia was shaken by the
political murders of Chokri Belaïd and Mohamed Brahmi and started to work
within the cultural sector of the party. He writes rap music songs with a social
background set in the cultural milieu of the popular district of Zaarouni. His
political activity is rooted in the neighbourhood and in Islamic charitable
associations such as the Red Crescent. He organises and participates in
debates and meetings with young people. In this, he embodies the heritage
of his father’s family, always active within the Islamic charity. «We Islamists
[islamiyyun] do this», he argued. More than a transmission of precise political
or ideological orientations, the subject of an intergenerational transmission is
the perpetuation of ethical-religious norms or moral assumptions (inevitably
reformulated) [Bennani-Chraïbi 2007].
I believe that the stories of the maturation of political commitment translate
the link between politics and other dimensions of associated and individual
life. In my opinion, a relevant point lies in the words with which Mousab
defined Ennahdha as an intergenerational party. «Fathers pass on this
experience to their children», he said. This is especially the case with
those Islamist militants who suffered torture and imprisonment during the
Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes.
If the link between political society and civil society emerges from
the formally controlled relationship between the party and charitable or
educational associations, the role of the family in joining the political party
must also be considered. The reference to the intergenerational transmission
of political belonging marks the unavoidable relations between the private
sphere par excellence – family – and the opening to the public world of politics
and parties.
Mousab was the first Islamist delegate to the faculty of law in El Manar,
coming first in the student elections. He gives me a very conflictual picture of
university politics, with frequent clashes in the recent past between Salafists
and leftist groups. He claims to have won the elections thanks to his open and
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pragmatic lifestyle: he talked about programmes, not ideologies, extending
communicative action beyond predefined affiliations. This pragmatism,
reflected in the patterns of Islamists’ political subjectivation, reveal their
complex approach toward the future, being able to combine the emphasis on
origins – every model of Islamic society relies upon the exemplary conduct
and teachings of Prophet Muhammad and his Companions – and the ambition
to evoke destiny through the anticipation of the future, addressing present
concerns and anxieties [Schielke 2015]. Mousab was fascinated by Salafism
after the Revolution, but now he claims that he is no longer attracted to it.
Tunisia is, for him – unlike for the Salafis – a model: Islam here is open and
plural; it is a universal principle and placed above the law, incorporating it.
My conversations with Mousab have confirmed my impression that patterns
of political subjectivation are nearly always entangled in personal and
collective imagines of the future. In his case, he had started engaging in
politics just after the Revolution, when hope for futural change turned into
tangible projects of action, practice, and mobilisation.
Mousab’s political path is a dynamic and open picture in which religious
identity and political affiliation are defined. Far from monolithic, it proves
the need to review and expand civil society’s conceptual horizons, testing the
liberal postulate of the autonomous individual-agent [Seligman 1992] with the
connections that link people, social memberships and categorical distinctions
between public and private [Persichetti 2006].
4. Conclusions
Before the Arab Spring, many scholars and observers have underlined the
chronic weakness of civic participation and political organisations in North
African countries [Sharabi 1996; Hammoudi 2001]. From 2011 onwards,
however, we cannot any longer take for granted the so-called authoritarian
syndrome [Camaus, Geisser 2003] as well as the supposed cannibalisation of
civil society by politics. Yet, an ethnographic examination of Tunisian civil
society requires us to reconsider its supposed submission to the State [Yom
2015].
Beyond Tunisia, in the Maghreb and along the south-eastern shore of the
Mediterranean, from Algeria to Lebanon, we are witnessing paths of political
subjectivation which have opened unexpected spaces of non-governability
and participation [Rivetti 2019] where before the microphysics of power
annihilated any possibility of action, resistance and imagination. Tunisia, the
country I have dealt with in these pages, is perhaps the best-known case and,
despite its many limitations, the happiest instance of this process.
In this article, I have focused on patterns of social and political commitment
of different kinds. Whether inspired by the ideals of civic participation
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or religious values, they equally represent patterns of thought and action
nourished by material needs and moral aspirations. Most of all, they are
oriented towards the construction of the future in times of great uncertainty.
Ten years after the escape of Ben Ali, an enduring economic crisis, increasing
social inequalities and political incertitude – aggravated by the current
pandemics – have turned into a permanent state of crisis, which gives shape to
a collective sense of living based on disorientation and disappointment in the
current political season. Up to this day, the “post-revolutionary transition” has
not fulfilled the expectations of radical social change promised by the Spring.
In the background of this scenario, the future becomes a powerful imaginative
and political resource, thematised within many collective projects and actions
which have been emerging in Tunisia over the last ten years. Mostly defined
on a local basis, these organisations are evidently inspired by shared “futural
orientations” as they intervene in the present by evoking and attempting to
anticipate the not-yet-realised potential of the future [Bryant, Knight 2019].
We may suppose that future-oriented practices and poetics that may be found
within the two experiences of activism I dealt with in these pages easily inform
people’s way of thinking and behaving in the context of a political change that
is still waiting to be fulfilled, as is the case in Tunisia.
The ethnographic examination of these processes allow us to grasp itineraries
of political subjectivation among young and older activists, whose personal
commitment matured or radically grew just after the Revolution. These
processes are characterised by an ethical reorientation of the Self of
social actors together with the assumption of political agency within their
communities [Vacchiano, Afailal 2019]. I suggest that one of the specificities
marking current itineraries of political subjectivation in Tunisia is that paths
of mobilisation are anchored in the historical and territorial framework of
local communities. This anchoring is emphasised and valued by activists.
Their daily intersubjective experience in neighbourhoods and municipalities
brings them in contact with people from different social, cultural and political
sensibilities. This is reflected in the multiple symbolic registers through which
political action and social activities are carried out.
As many studies and a great deal of research projects have highlighted,
the political subjectivation of the multitudes [Kilani 2014] in Tunisia and
other North African and Middle East countries started a decade ago has
been nourished by transnational connections whose reverberation extends
beyond the Mediterranean. Ideas and values mobilised within these plural
trajectories of research of freedom become global signifiers, and settle in
global ideoscapes [Appadurai 1996], the circulation of which is facilitated
enormously by current communication technologies and human mobility.
However, we would be wrong to perceive a global ecumene of homogeneity
and uniformity. Future, like destiny, is a malleable resource [Guenzi 2012,
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quoted in Bryant, Knight 2019], the subject of multiple, creative and always
original treatments. The paths of political subjectivation outlined in this article
in relation to Tunisia, combined in their apparent irreducibility since they
present, on the one hand, the progressive face of secular associations and,
on the other, the political activism in a conservative party with a religious
reference, offer a framework of complementarity necessary in order to grasp
the questioning of the present and the future in the Mediterranean of our day.
In both cases, emancipation is not a purely individualist goal, but is
achieved within groups and communities towards which the sense of
belonging is nurtured. This applies as much to the case of Mousab, whose
political commitment originated from a background of family and religious
identification codes, as well as the association of the inhabitants of El
Mourouj II. The latter associative action takes shape and, indeed, would not
be imaginable outside of shared images and ideas of the future on which social
ties and processes of mutual recognition are grafted.
Yet, attention to the different symbolic matrices of the social bond and to the
multiple ways of constructing political participation invites us to broaden the
analytical and conceptual grids with which we think of the forms of collective
action and the historical modes of intervention in the world, within the current
panoramas of mobilisation, belonging, and revolt.
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